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IN THE 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DON FOSTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
ELMO J. STEED, an individual, 
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WHEELER dba S & W TEXACO SERVICE, 
a partnership and TEXACO, INC., 
a corporation 
Defendants 
TEXACO, INC. a corporation 
Defendant and Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 
10685 
This is an action for personal injuries resulting from 
a fire at the S & W Texaco Service in Bountiful, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant Texaco filed a motion for summary judg-
ment which was denied. Texaco's petition for intermediate 
appeal to this court was granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Texaco seeks a reversal of the order denying its mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed: At approximately 
6 :30 P.M. on May 21, 1964, the plaintiff, Don Foster, 
went to the S & W Texaco Service at 530 South 200 
West, Bountiful, to buy gas for his truck. (Foster dep. 
page 6) While Foster was at the station he was asked 
by Gordon G. Wheeler, a partner in Texaco Service, and 
Bob Madall, an employee of the S & W Texaco Service, to 
help push a car into one of the bays of the service station. 
(Foster dep. page 7) Foster was then asked to help start 
the car by pouring gas in the carburetor. (Foster dep. 
page 8) Foster said "It will blow up." He was assured 
by Bob Madall that it wouldn't blow up. (Foster dep. page 
9) Foster proceeded to pour gas into the carburetor while 
Gordon G. Wheeler was blowing air in the gas tank and 
Bob Madall was starting the car. (Foster dep. page 9) 
While Foster was pouring gas in the carburetor, the motor 
backfired setting the gas on fire. (Foster dep. page 11) 
Foster jerked back and threw burning gas all over the 
upper part of his body. (Foster dep. page 11) Foster 
stepped back on to the edge of a can of gas spilling it 
all over himself and all over the floor. This gas was also 
ignited and burned the plaintiff. (Foster dep. page 11) 
Foster filed suit against Elmo J. Steed, an individual, Gor-
don G. Wheeler, an individual, Elmo J. Steed and Gordon 
G. Wheeler dba S & W Texaco Service, a partnership 
and Texaco, Inc., a corporation. At the time of the acci-
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dent Texaco, Inc. had leased the service station premises 
to Gordon G. Wheeler. (Simmons dep. page 5; copy of 
lease agreement is found at R 51-52) There was an 
Agreement Of Sale in existence between Texaco, Inc. and 
Gordon G. Wheeler at the time of the accident. (copy of 
Agreement Of Sale is found at R 53-54) 
Mr. Simmons, Texaco Division Service Representative, 
testified at his deposition that Texaco does not have any 
right to hire or fire the employees that are employed by 
the dealer. (Simmons dep. page 18) Texaco does not have 
any control over the hours for operating or closing the 
station. (Simmons dep. page 18) The expenses of operating 
the station are paid by the dealer. (Simmons dep. page 18) 
Steed and Wheeler were on a cash basis with Texaco so 
they were required to pay for their gas and accessories 
on a cash basis. (Simmons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler 
were free to turn around and sell products that they 
purchased from Texaco at any price which they felt would 
be competitive with the other dealers in the area. (Sim-
mons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler also bought au-
tomobile accessories from other sources than Texaco. 
(Simmons dep. page 18) Steed and Wheeler were also in 
a position to buy petroleum products from sources other 
than Texaco. (Simmons dep. page 18) These items could 
all be sold at a retail price of the dealer's choosing. (Sim-
mons dep. page 19) There were no reports required to 
be submitted by Steed and Wheeler to Texaco. (Simmons 
dep. page 19) Simmons would make periodic visits to the 
station to see that it was "sparkling and clean." The pur-
pose of these visits was to assist the dealer to be com-
petitive and to furnish him marketing helps that he could 
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use to improve his business. (Simmons dep. page 19) How-
ever, Steed and Wheeler were free to do whatever they 
wished in operating the business. (Simmons dep. page 19) 
Steed and Wheeler could also sell their products on a 
credit basis if they desired. (Simmons dep. page 20) 
POINT I 
STEED AND WHEELER OPERATED THE 
S & W TEXACO SERVICE AS INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS AND WERE NOT THE 
AGENTS OF TEXACO, INC. 
The determinative question of whether or not a service 
station operator is an independent contractor or an agent 
of the producing company is one of control. If the pro-
ducing company has the control or the right to control the 
manner in which the operations are carried out, then the 
service station operator is generally held to be the agent 
of the producing company. Conversely, if the control ex-
tends only to the result to be achieved, then the station 
operator is regarded as an independent contractor and the 
producing company is not liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. In determining whether or not the 
relationship between the oil producer and the station 
operator is that of an independent contractor or master-
servant relationship, the formal contract between the 
parties is of substantial importance. In looking to the 
contract, the way in which the station operator was com-
pensated, the manner in which title to the business proper-
ty and the product to be sold was held, and the degree 
to which the oil company supervised the day to day 
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conduct of the business are important. See 83 ALR 2d 
1282 "Status of Gasoline and Oil Distributor or Dealer 
as Agent, Employee, Independent Contractor or Independent 
Dealer as Regards Responsibility for Injury to Person or 
Damage to Property". 
In the following cases the courts determined that the 
defendant oil company had neither exercised nor retained 
control over the operation of the filling station and was 
not liable for the negligent acts of the filling station 
operator or the operator's employees. 
In Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 124 So. 
2d 517, 83 ALR 2d 1276, (Florida 1960) an action was 
brought for bodily injuries and property damage resulting 
from the improper repair of brakes at a service station. 
The action was brought against Phillips Petroleum Co. 
and the operator of a Phillips 66 Service Station. Re-
covery against Phillips was sought on the theory that 
the station operator was its agent or on the theory of 
apparent agency. The lower court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Phillips. On appeal, the judgment was af-
firmed on the ground that the oil company did not have 
control or right of control over the operator's methods 
of conducting his business. The court pointed out that 
where the oil company did not control the filling station 
operator's method of operation, nor the hiring or firing of 
employees, did not set the retail price for gasoline sold at 
the station, nor hours of opening and closing, could not 
require reports on operations from the operator and could 
not force him to comply with suggestions except to the 
extent that it had power to cancel the franchise, then the 
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operator was an independent contractor and not an em-
ployee of the company. 
In Miller v. Sinclair Oil Refining Company, 268 F. 
2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959) an action was brought against Sin-
clair for injuries sustained when the plaintiff was se-
verely burned in a fire. The plaintiff was standing beside 
his automobile while it was being filled with gasoline when 
another automobile collided with the gasoline pumps 
causing the fire. The lower court directed a verdict in favor 
of the defendant oil company and on appeal the decision 
was affirmed. With regard to the question of control or 
right of control over the service station operator, the court 
said: 
"The answer would appear to depend on the 
facts of each case, and the main fact to be con-
sidered would be the right of control as to the mode 
of doing the work contracted for. Gulf Refining Co. 
v. Wilkinson, supra. In this case it is clear that the 
oil company did not control the dealer's methods of 
operation. It did not control the hiring or firing of 
employees ; did not set the retail prices for gas sold 
at the station; did not set the hours for opening 
and closing the station; required no reports on 
operations from Rogers ; and could not force Rogers 
to comply with any of its suggestions except to the 
extent that it had the power to cancel the contract 
at the end of any year. Rogers' independent status 
is further emphasized by the fact that he purchased 
his gas from Sinclair for cash, handled automobile 
tires and other merchandise other than Sinclair's, 
was free to and did engage in other lines of busi-
ness, supplied his own building and equipment ex-
cept for the tanks and pumps, and stood to retain all 
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of the profits and suffer all of the losses from the 
operation of the station." 
In Green v. Independent Oil Company, 201 A. 2d 207 
(Penn. 1964) an action was brought for deaths resulting 
from an explosion at a service station. Here an employee 
of the service station was cleaning the station by spread-
ing a mixture of kerosene, gasoline and soap on the floor. 
Shortly after he started to spread the mixture a sheet of 
flame swept through the service station injuring the plain-
tiff, a customer on the premises. The oil company was named 
as a defendant on the theory that it had the right to 
control the manner of performing the work at the service 
station. The employee attempted to establish a master-
servant relationship between the service station operator 
and the oil company on the basis of the dealer's agree-
ment, together with the fact that on frequent occasions 
representatives of the oil company visited the service 
station. The court pointed out that even though the oil 
company's representatives visited the service station there 
was no evidence that they gave any suggestions or in-
structions or exercised any control as to the manner of 
operating the gasoline service station. The court stated 
that such visits to the service station by the oil company's 
representatives in no manner indicated any right of control 
by the oil company and were not pertinent on the question 
of the nature of the relationship. The court concluded that 
the relationship between the oil company and the service 
station operator was that of an independent contractee-
contractor not employer-employee so the oil company was 
not liable for the lessee's alleged negligence. 
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In Coe v. Esau and Continental Co., 377 P. 2d 815 
(Oklahoma 1963) an action was brought against a service 
station operator and his lessor to recover for damage to 
plaintiff's automobile for lack of adequate lubrication 
occasioned by an escape of oil through a faulty oil filter 
gasket installed by the operator. In support of the argu-
ment that the service station operator was the agent of 
Continental, the plaintiff called the court's attention to 
the following facts : 
a. Continental owned the premises on which the serv-
ice station was located ; 
b. Continental's name was prominently displayed upon 
the station premises; 
c. The station was listed under the heading Conoco 
Service Station in the telephone directory; 
d. The operator received advice and suggestions from 
Conoco concerning the standard of cleanliness at the sta-
tion but he did not have to abide by them; 
e. The operator paid 1%,¢ on each gallon of gas sold; 
f. Although the operator controlled his business hours, 
he was required to occupy the premises and operate the 
station or he would lose such right. 
The court held that the operator of the service station 
was an independent contractor. The court stated: 
"The facts and circumstances adduced by plain-
tiff's evidence are insufficient to raise the necessary 
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inference that Continental either had the right to 
control or exercised the right to control the con-
duct of Esau in the operation of his station. Esau 
was free to, and did handle, tires and automotive 
accessories of other suppliers; he procured his own 
personnel, determined the daily business hours and 
the methods of doing business. The petroleum prod-
ucts supplied by Continental were sold to Esau on a 
cash basis. So far as the record discloses, Esau was 
not in any way restricted in adopting his own mer-
chandising policies." 
Plaintiff contends that even if Steed and Wheeler were 
independent contractors, Texaco is still liable, citing the 
case of Boronskis v. The Texas Company, 183 N.E. 2d 127 
(Mass. 1962). In that case the plaintiff was injured as a 
result of gasoline leaking from a defective gasoline tank. 
The injury was caused by a defect in the premises. The 
Boronskis case has no application to the case at bar. In 
the instant case the alleged hazardous condition was a 
movable item of personalty. The can of gas was placed 
in the bay area by one of the lessees or their employees. 
Although a landlord may have a duty to make repairs to 
defects in the premises that might have been disclosed 
by ordinary care in making an inspection, this duty does 
not extend to a movable item of personalty that may be 
changed at will by the tenant. 
The duty of a landlord regarding defects in the prem-
ises as distinguished from movable items of personalty was 
discussed in Sincwir Refining Company v. Redding, 133 
N.E. 2d 421 (Georgia 1963) where the court held that Sin-
clair was not liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff 
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in tripping over an advertising sign placed on the sidewalk 
by the service station operators. 
The court stated : 
"But the placement of items of personalty, such 
as a sign of the type here involved, is something 
that may change frequently and at any time. It may 
be in a perfectly safe position at one time of the 
day and at another, even a few minutes later, in 
an unsafe position. It is something that can and 
may be moved at will by the tenant, his employees 
or by some third party. Defects in the premises 
may result from faulty construction or they may 
come on gradually, perhaps getting a bit worse 
from day to day as time goes on, until a dangerous 
or unsafe condition obtains. The only change cal-
culated to come about unless repairs are made is a 
further deterioration. If the sign had been per-
manently affixed in an unsafe position or if it had 
been in a defective condition the rule of Anderson 
might have been applicable. But neither appears 
from the evidence here." 
Plaintiff has previously argued that Texaco's repaint-
ing of the charred areas shows it had control over the 
lessees of the service station. Gordon Wheeler testified in 
his deposition that the inside of the station was due to be 
painted anyway, so Texaco went ahead with the painting 
after the fire. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Well, was it reported unoffi-
cially? 
A. (By Mr. Wheeler) Well, the salesman came. I 
told him what had happened and he says, "Well, 
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the station is due to be painted." This is the 
outside of the station is cleaned one year, the 
inside one year on an alternating basis, and it 
was time for the station to be painted inside. 
Texaco's commitment to paint the station every year 
does not show that it exercised or retained control over 
the operation of the filling station. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts conclusively show that Texaco neither exer-
cised nor retained control over the operation of the station. 
The hazard of which the plaintiff complains, was a mov-
able item of personalty, not a defect in the premises. Texaco 
respectfully contends that it is entitled to a summary 
judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for defendant and 
appellant Texaco, Inc. 
